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We show that the consideration of Stackelberg equilibrium and reasonable conjecture equilibria
(R.e.E.) provide sorne foundation to the concept of limit pricing.
1. Introduction
This paper deals with the problem of entry deterrence in two different
ways. First, we analyze conditions under which entry prevention is the best
strategy for an incumbent firm, and second, we link entry prevention with
another important field of industrial organization, the analysis of reasonable
conjectures.
That entry prevention may be of interest for incumbent firms has been
studied by Osborne (1973), Spence (1977), Dixit (1979), Salop (1979),
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Omori and Yarrow (1982). In aH these
papers equilibrium concept is sorne kind of Stackelberg equilibrium in which
potential entrants behave in Cournot fashion and the incumbent firm is a
Stackelberg leader. We foHow this approach by widening the model to aHow
more general conjectures for entrants.
The theory of reasonable conjectures has been developed by Hahn (1978),
in the framework of an exchange economy, and Hart (1982), in an oligopoly
model with decreasing returns to scale. This theory attempts to endogenize
conjectures assuming that firms choose those conjectures which maximize
profits. 'BasicaHy the conjectures of firms are reasonable if, given the
conjectures of aH other firms, no firm can increase its profit by departing
from its own conjectures. That is, a resonable conjectural equilibrium is a
Nash equilibrium where the strategies of firms are conjectures' [Hart (1982,
p. 2)].
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The idea that conjectures are the 'right' strategic space is quite appealing
since conjectures can represent very different types of behaviour. However,
Hart's results point out the existence of a large number of R.C.E. [Hart
(1985, p. 129)]. In the final section we will argue that if economies of scale
are considered, this may be changed.
Another interesting feature of R.CE. is that, in such an equilibrium,
conjectures must be local1y correct [see Hart (1982) pp. 19-20]. This last
requirement has been used in the literature under the name of consistent
conjectural variations [see Bresnahan (1981), Perry (1982), Tanaka (1985)
and Ulph (1983)]. Sorne of their results will be discussed in the final section.
In this paper we will prove that a kind of generalized Stackelberg
equilibrium prevents the entry of any potential entrant (Proposition 1).
Moreover under slightIy stronger conditions, the limit price (see ahead
definition 5) is a generalized Stackelberg equilibrium price (Proposition 2).
Final1y we analyze R.CE. We do not obtain a complete characterization of
the set of R.CE. in our economy (which differs from Hart's paper (1982) in
that economies of scale are present here). We will prove that the usual
Stackelberg equilibrium is a R.CE. That provides a rationale for the Sylos
postulate (Le., the assumption that potential entrants behave in a Cournot
way). This is our Proposition 3. We end the paper with sorne comments on
the significance of our results.
2. Major definitions
We will consider a homogeneous goods market in which there are m firms.
Firm 1 is the incumbent and firms 2,3, ... , m are potential entrants.
Let Xi be the outpout of firm i and X= Ii= 1 Xi' The price of the product is
p. Let p(x) be the inverse demand function which is assumed to be strictIy
decreasing. Profits for firm i are n¡ (X¡,X_i)=P(X)xi-c¡(x¡), X-i=X-X i is the
output of the remaining firms and C¡(Xi) is the cost function of firm i with
C¡(O) =0. We will assume that c¡(x¡}=cj(x j) if Xi=Xj Vi,j=2,3, ... ,m, i.e. they
share the same cost function.
Definition 1. A conjecture for firm i is a real valued function !X¡(Xi;P,X¡)
defined VXi' Xi' pE R +.
The interpretation of a conjecture is that 'given a status quo position
where the price is Pand the firm is producing Xi' firm i conjectures that if it
changed its supply to Xi' the equilibrium price would change to !Xi(x¡, P, X¡)'
[Hart (1982)].
Definition 2. The correspondence F¡(p, Xi) is said to be the reaction corre-
spondence for firm i = 2, 3, ... ,m if
We will assume that firms 2,3, ... , m share the same conjecture. Therefore
their reaction correspondences are identical.
Definition 3. A tuple (x~, ... ,x:",pS) is said to be a Generalized Stackelberg
Equilibrium (G.S.E.) with firm 1 as a leader if (a) pS = p(x~ + ... + x:"), (b)
(xf, ... ,x:",pS) maximizes nI (xI,x-d subject to x¡EF¡(pS,xf), i=2,3,oo.,m.
That is, at a G.S.E. firms 2,3, ... , m maximize profits according to their
conjectures and firm 1, subject to this constraint, maximizes its profits.
Notice that if conjectures for firms 2,3,oo.,m were of the Cournot type (see
definition 7) a G.S.E. would be the usual notion of a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Dejinition 4. A price p is said to prevent entry if 'ti i = 2,3, ... , m, OE F¡(p, O).
Definition 5. A price pI is said to be the limit price if pI ~P'ti p, both (pI
and p) satisfying definition 4. Notice that in this definition the value of pI
depends on the conjecture of entrants.
Definition 6. A reasonable conjectural equilibrium is a tuple
(p*, xL 00 • , x~, aL 00 • , a~) so that
(l) p* = p(x*)
(2) x1 maximizes a1 (x¡,p*,xnx¡-c¡(x¡) i=l, 2, 3,oo.,m
(3) 'ti i = 1,2, ... , m there does not exist p, XI' oo., Xm , where p= p(X) and Xj
fulfils (2) 'ti j =1 i so that n¡(x) > n¡(x*).
The previous definition is taken from [Hart (1982, pp. 5-6)J. Condition (2)
requires x* to be a conjectural equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium relative to
conjectures ai, ... , a~. Condition (3) states that each firm is maximizing
profits given the conjectures of the other firms.
The motivation for studying R.C.E. is 'The idea that firms do not care
about the correctness of their conjectures per se, but only about whether they
are maximizing profits. In a R.C.E. while there may be errors in a firm's
conjecture, they are not of the sort that lead to reduce profits' [Hart (1982)
pp.2)].
We end this section with a definition of a special kind of conjectures.
Definition 7. A conjecture is said to be of Cournot type if a¡(x¡, p¡, Xi) =
p[x¡ - X¡ +P-I(p)J.
3. Results
We add the fol1owíng assumption that characleríze structure of the
índustry:
Assumption
(a) CI(XI)/XI is no! increa~ing on Xl'
(b) 3 i, xf =0,
(c) xi >0.
Statement (a) is a way of introducíng economíes of seale; (b) implies that the
number of potential entrants is large enough and (e) that the incumbent firm
ís active at the G.S. E.
Proposition l. Given Assumption 1 (xi, ... , x~) = (xi, O, ... , O) i.e., pS = p(xi)
prevents entry.
Proa! Suppose il is nol ~o. Then xi, X2""'X~>0 and X~+I""'X~=O i.e.,
OEFj(pS,O),j=h+ l, ... ,m.
Now, if firm 1 produces
Xl =xi + ... +x:',
pS prevents entry by any other firm, í.e., OE F¡(pS, O), i ~ 2, ...• m. On the other
hand profits for the incumbent
are now bígger and, lherefore xi does not fulIfiI (b) in Definition 3. 1
Now let us introduce an addítional requirement in order to prove that
limit price is a G.S.E. price.2
Assumption 2
(a) The profit func1ion of the incumbent is quasieoncave in Xl
IOmorj am:l Yarmw U9821 ha~e pm~ed a stmrlar pmposrtlon. They modet a more generar
case for a market WHh a heterogeneous product, bU! their assumptions are somewhat stmnger
In particular we do no! requlre the Incumbent firm to be Idenllcal to the potential entrants and
we do not need fixed COSIS 6ut the main dítTerence is that in our case conJectures of the entrants
are not necessarily Cournot, 1 e , (he so called Sylos postulate IS nOI necessary for our proof (see
Section 4, 2).
2And hence (x\,O, ... ,O), where xl =p-l(pl), is a G.s.E.
(b) Limit price is lower than monopoly price.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, pi is a G.S.E. price.
Proof Because of Definition 5 if the incumbent chooses pi then OE F¡
(pi, O), i = 2,3, ... , m.
On the other hand, pS also prevents entry (Proposition 1), hence pS~ pi. If
we calI Xl = P-l(ps) and x~ = p -l(pl) then Xl ~ xL and, from Assumption 2,
ni (Xl,O, ... ,O)~nl(xLO,... ,O), i.e., x~ yields at least as much profit as x~.
This completes the proof.3
We conclude proving that the usual Stackelberg equilibrium notion is a
R.CE.
Proposition 3. Given Assumption 1, Stackelberg equilibrium is a R.CE.
Proof It is clear that (XSb O, ... , O) is an equilibrium relative to sorne
conjectures, i.e., part 2) in Definition 6 is fulfilIed. If firm 1 holds Xl constant,
then no firm 2,3, ... , m can make a profit since Xl prevents entry. Therefore
Cournot conjectures maximize profits for these firms (many other conjectures
would possibly yield this conclusion as welI). In addition, if firms 2,3, ... , m
hold Cournot conjectures, firm 1 cannot do better than to choose the
Stackelberg conjecture since, by its very definition, it maximizes profits for
firm 1 if 2,3, ... , m hold their Cournot conjectures.
A similar proposition has been provided by D. Ulph (1983) for the case of
m=2 (but Ulph uses a consistent conjectural equilibrium instead of a
R.CE.). However Ulph's proof does not generalize for m> 2. This is so
because the logic behind his proof is that once firm 1 has chosen Xl (and the
correspondent Stackelberg conjecture), the Cournot-type conjecture for firm
2 is 10calIy consistent. However if a third firm with a Cournot-type
conjecture is introduced, the aboye conjecture for firm 2 ceases to be
consistent, since X3 will, in general, change if X2 is changed.
FinalIy note that Proposition 1 is robust to the introduction of more
incumbents. Indeed, assuming that each incumbent behaves both as Cournot
with respect to any other incumbent and as a generalized Stackelberg leader
with respect to similar potential entrants, we can prove similar resuIts to
Proposition 1. In this sense, imperfect coordination among incumbents is
irrelevant to show that G.S.E. prevents entry [for problems raised by such
imperfect coordination, consuIt Gilbert and Vives (1984)]. However this
equilibrium is not a R.CE. since Cournot behaviour is seldom reasonable
30bviously if Rt( -) is slriclly quasiconcave then p' = pt is the unique O.S.E. price.
when more than one firm is active (see the aboye discussion on Ulph's result
when m>2).
4. Final cornrnents
(1) Propositions 1 and 2 can be regarded as sorne kind of 'domino
theorem'. Indeed the existence of an inactive potential competitor prevents
entry for any potential entrants. The interpretation of this result is that when
m is small, limit pricing may be an expensive strategy (i.e., a low pi causes
low profits). However if the number of potential competitors is large enough,
the cost of limit pricing is small in comparison to the cost of having all these
firms in the market. Therefore the right alternative for the incumbent firm is
to prevent entry.
(2) The most common criticism of limit pricing theory is that it is based on
an assumption (the Sylos postulate) that is not derived from the rational
behaviour of agents. This paper refutes this view in two ways. First the so
called Sylos postulate is not necessary for the theory. All we need is that
potential entrants share the same conjecture and that at least one firm
remain inactive. Second, the usual Stackelberg equilibrium is a R.C.E. and
therefore rational in sorne sense.
(3) Even though our approach is static, Propositions 1 and 2 may be of
interest to the dynamic theory of the dominant firmo Suppose we start stage
zero with an incumbent and one potential entrant. Suppose also that the
G.S.E. implies a positive output for the entrant [as may occur in Dixit
(1979)]. Now suppose that a new competitor arrives at stage one and that
G.S.E. again implies a positive output for this firm, and that in periods
2,3, . .. we have identical results. Our Propositions 1 and 2 imply that at
sorne stage the behaviour of the incumbent will change dramatically. Indeed,
sooner or later, if the incumbent behaves as a Stackelberg leader, it will find
incentives to fight (and to win) a price war against its competitors.
(4) Conjectures which are used in the proof of Proposition 3 can be shown
to be consistent, i.e., potential entrants are right in their assumption that
total output is fixed and the incumbent is right in assuming that potential
entrants are of the Cournot type. Therefore our R.C.E. is in fact a consistent
conjectural equilibrium of the kind discussed in the Introduction.
However our Proposition 3 is in conflict with the finding of sorne authors
concerning the properties of consistent conjectural equilibrium (C.C.E.). For
example it has been claimed that under increasing returns to scale no C.C.E.
exists [see Bresnahan (1981) p. 939 and Perry (1982) p. 202]. But actually all
they prove is that no symmetrical C.C.E. exists with more than one active
firmo Our Proposition 3 implies that C.C.E. exists when only one firm in the
market survives. Therefore putting together our Proposition 3 and the
Bresnahan-Perry result we get the impression that under economies of scale
C.C.E. and R.C.E. may imply strong restrictions for the equilibrium set: in
fact the case may be that only one firm can be active.
FinaUy notice also that our analysis refutes the belief that in a situation of
free entry only competitive equilibrium is a c.c.E. [see Perry (1982) and
Tanaka (1985)].
(5) An interesting problem (which is not treated in our paper) is to study
welfare associated with entry prevention and with competition. Some exam-
pIes - obtained from the authors on request - show that the sum of
consumer and producer surpluses in a linear economy, are larger under entry
prevention that under competition ala Cournot in almost any possible case.
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